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THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA: 
ITS HISTORIOGRAPHY, ITS CHRONOLOGY, ITS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Donald J.C. Phillipson 
Abstract 
The history of the NRC is approached from two perspectives: first, in terms of the historiographical 
ideas presented in the literature, and second, in terms of its place within the science policy debates. 
There follow a select chronology and bibliography of the NRC. 
Résumé 
Cet essai porte sur la place occupée par le CNR dans l'histoire des sciences au Canada, telle que 
reflétée par l'historiographie, et dans les débats sur la politique scientifique canadienne. Il est suivi 
d'une chronologie des principaux événements qui traitent de son histoire. 
At not many conferences do the papers presented form by themselves a com-
plete and proportionate portrait of their subject. That of the Canadian Science 
and Technology Historical Association in 1991 on the 75th anniversary of the Na-
tional Research Council of Canada was no different. This essay is written both in 
order to summarize the published historiography of the NRC and to sketch such 
a portrait for readers who may not be familiar with its literature. 
There now are some two dozen books about the National Research Council in 
whole or in part, and twice as many articles, by a variety of hands from doctoral 
candidates to mature scholars and from hired propagandists to personal 
memoirists. It covers the range from narrative to critical history, shading into po-
lemic. 
The literature of the NRC is unusual in one respect: the influence on historians 
of a single document written by non-historians, the Lamontagrie Report, dis-
cussed below. Because of either its literary qualities, its adoption by government 
staff or the absence of any alternative, its hundred-page historical summary has 
1 4050 Hall's Road, Carlsbad Springs, Ontario KOA1K0. 
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had more influence than any other work on historians writing since 1970 about 
theNRC. 
Narrative History of the National Research Council 
The history of the NRC is divisible into convenient periods. 
1. From its foundation (1916) up to the NRC Act of 1924. The period may be 
called a quest for internal leadership and a social niche, as the new organization 
defined its role in the national and government communities. 
2. The growth period, 1924 to 1945, of the Tory and McNaughton presidencies, 
including the Depression, 1929-39, when the NRC Laboratories were manned, 
and the Second World War, when they grew to their present order of magnitude. 
3. Postwar development, between the NRC Acts of 1964 and 1966: the so-called 
'Golden Age' of the Mackenzie and Steacie presidencies. 
4. The last 25 years. 
The first three periods, up to the 1960s, are now basically if not exhaustively doc-
umented. The NRC was formed during the First World War as a general-pur-
pose national scientific agency, like Britain's Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization of Australia. Like them, it had a unique prehistory. The Royal So-
ciety of Canada, the Canadian Institute of Toronto and the Montreal business 
community had earlier agitated for the development of national science.2 The 
Canadian government convened an Honorary Advisory Council on Scientific 
and Industrial Research in 1916 in answer to these lobbies, modelled on the Im-
perial Trust for Scientific and Industrial Research formed in Britain in 1915. 
The early history of the NRC (as it came to be called) is documented in The 
Inner Ring (1966) by Mel Thistle, a staff member for thirty years. This work is not 
a formal history but a selection of primary documents with a connecting narra-
tive. The book is indispensable to the history of Canadian science and the selec-
tion generally excellent: Thistle identified in the records of 1916-35 many 
primary topics, such as the NRCs relation with government departments and 
ministers, of recurring importance. 
2 Philip C. Enros, The "Bureau of Scientific and Industrial Research" of the Royal Canadian In-
stitute 1914-1918/ HSTC Bulletin 23 (1983). 
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The Inner Ring remains an essential source, however narrowly based on NRC re-
cords and staff lore. Its flaws are those of 'insider writing' and by themselves 
demonstrate the ideology or loyalty of the NRC staff which was for decades one 
of its practical instruments. Its historiographie defects were largely repaired in 
Wilfrid Eggleston's National Research in Canada (1978), a narrative history of 
the NRC's first fifty years. A newspaperman with a lifelong interest in the NRC, 
Eggleston's research methods sent him to Hansard and other sources Thistle 
omitted, so that his account of the NRC Bill of 1921, the first disaster in NRC 
history, shows where Thistle's is anachronistic and unreliable. 
As Thistle noticed, one reason for Tory's success in persuading the government 
to approve the establishment of the NRC Laboratories was the creation of the 
Ontario Research Foundation, and Ottawa's unwillingness to do less than 
Queen's Park. Tory's larger ambitions towards national science were frustrated 
by continuing bad relations with the technical civil service and by the Depres-
sion. Only months before the NRC's 'palace of science' was opened in 1932, the 
government abolished all vacant posts throughout the public service, before the 
NRC Laboratories were half manned. 
A.G.L. McNaughton made enlarging the NRC staff a condition of his accepting 
the presidency in 1935. A totally different personality, McNaughton developed 
successful political relations with the technical civil service, while maintaining 
harmoniously the extramural university scholarships and grants created by his 
predecessors. He took the NRC into the international realm at the Common-
wealth Scientific Conference of 19366 and in 1938 introduced the NRC into the 
domain of medical research, just in time to develop aviation medicine and other 
such specialities in wartime. 
By 1939 the NRC Laboratories had 300 staff (75 research professionals) in four 
laboratory divisions. Histories of the divisions of Biology, Physics and Mechani-
cal Engineering provide abundant detail about their foundation and the person-
3 Peter Oliver, 'Government, Industry and Science in Ontario' in Public and Private Persons 
(Toronto, 1975). 
4 John Swettenham, McNaughton: Vol 11887-1939 (Toronto, 1968). 
5 Yves Gingras, Physics and the Rise of Scientific Research in Canada (Montreal and Kings-
ton, 1991). 
6 D J.C. Phillipson, International Scientific Liaison and the NRCC, 1916-1974 (Ottawa, 1985). 
7 N X Gridgeman, Biological Sciences at the NRCC: the Early Years to 1952 (Waterloo, 1979); 
W.E. Knowies Middleton, Mechanical Engineering at the NRCC, 1929-1951 (Waterloo, 1984) 
and Physics at the NRCC, 1929-1952 (Waterloo, 1979). 
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alities and projects of the time. The history of the Chemistry division, half the 
Laboratories staff, was never completed as planned. 
By the outbreak of the Second World War the NRC was poised to mobilize na-
tional science for war research, as had not been possible in 1914-18. C J. Mac-
kenzie became Acting President, chief science adviser to the three armed 
services and the link with American and British research: the NRC was in Can-
ada the counterpart of the OSRD or the Ministry of Supply. The NRC Labora-
tories staff grew to nearly 3,000 after the creation of a large radar branch and the 
administrative absorption of the Anglo-French atomic project. The early war pe-
riod is documented in Thistle.8 After the war, the NRC commissioned a general 
account of those of its activities that could then be made public 
in i i io 
Later specialized works deal with wartime foods research, war gases, radar, 
experimental aircraft and the ChurchiU/Mountbatten scheme for an iceberg 
aircraft carrier. The atomic project functioned as a division of the NRC from 
1944 onwards, was 'Canadianized' in 1946, and became a separate Crown corpo-
ration, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, in 1952; its official historian is Robert 
Bothwell and there are books by LeBourdais, Eggleston and others. Period-
ical literature varies from Laurence to Fawcett. 
8 Mel W. Thistle,(ed.), The Mackenzie-McNaughton Wartime Letters (Toronto, 1975). 
Mackenzie's periodical reports to McNaughton. 
9 Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War (Toronto, 1950). 
10 F.T. Rosser and M.W. Thistle, War Stories from Biology (Ottawa,1955). 
11 John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947 (Toronto, 1989). 
12 W.K. Knowles Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: the Radio Branch of the NRCC 
(Waterloo, 1981) and David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa (Toronto, 1989), 
'Organization of Science for War... Canadian Radar Development, 1939-45/ Scientia Can-
adensis 31 (1986) and 'Radar and Research Enterprises Limited/ Ontario History 80:2 (1988). 
13 Rex King and Harald Penrose, The Ptailless Ones: G.T.R. Hill's series of Pterodactyl.../ Aero-
plane Monthly (July, 1973). 
14 Susan Langley, 'Project Habbakuk: World War II Prototype Vessel/ Scientia Canadensis 31 
(1986). 
15 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: the History of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (Toronto, 1988). 
16 D.M. LeBourdais, Canada and the Atomic Revolution (Toronto, 1959). 
17 Wilfrid Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story (Toronto, 1965). 
18 G.C. Laurence, 'Canada's Participation in Atomic Energy Development/ Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (Nov. 1947); Ruth Fawcett, 'Early... Nuclear Power Reactors of Wilfred Ben-
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Victory brought the NRC a new and freer charter. The Cabinet revived in 1944 
for postwar planning the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial 
Research (the first statutory Cabinet committee in Canadian history, dating from 
the NRC Act of 1917) and invited the NRC to absorb the whole of government 
research. No doubt to the politicians' surprise Mackenzie declined, and instead 
recommended (jointly with Charles Camsell, deputy minister of Mines) substan-
tial growth in government science after the war, but on a specialized, departmen-
tal and polycentric basis. Under this rubric the Defence Research Board was 
created in 1947,19 the atomic project independently constituted in 1952, and the 
Medical Research Council in 1960 from the postwar NRC Division of Medical 
Research. Not least, the NRC was authorized to maintain the staff and budget 
($6 million) to which it had grown in wartime. It then constituted 40 per cent of 
government science, a proportion which declined to 12 per cent by 1961, as the 
other organizations grew. 
Under an amended Act of 1946, the NRC was authorized to build pilot-scale in-
dustrial plants and to form a subsidiary, Canadian Patents and Developments 
Ltd, for the commercial development of Crown-owned patents. The NRC Labo-
ratories were reorganized, pure research divisions created for physics and chem-
istry and dozens of NRC post-doctoral fellowships created to keep the 
Laboratories in touch with the latest developments in academic science. Inde-
pendent or non-industrial research was authorized elsewhere in the NRC Labo-
ratories for selected individuals and teams, of which radio astronomy was the 
most notable. l 
The years from 1945 to the 1960s are now remembered as the 'golden age' of the 
NRC. For the first time the organization had both a general plan for national de-
velopment and the resources to carry it out, including political backing and the 
enthusiastic co-operation of university scientists as well as an adequate indepen-
dent budget. The general plan was based on the conventional wisdom of the day. 
There were three sectors of the national community, academe, government and 
industry, three types of scientific and engineering knowledge, pure, applied and 
nett Lewis/ Scientia Canadensis 31 (1986), 132-8. 
19 D J. Goodspeed, DRB: a History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa, 1958). 
20 A.W.T. Tickner, Tostdoctoral Fellowships in the National Research Laboratory/ Canadian 
Chemical News (October, 1985), 17-19. See Tickner's article in this collection. 
21 A.E. Covington, 'Beginnings of Solar Astronomy in Canada,' in W.T.Sullivan III (ed.) The 
Early Years of Radio Astronomy (Cambridge, 1984), R.A. Jarrell, The Cold Light of Dawn 
(Toronto, 1988) and Gayle Young, The Sackbut Blues: Hugh Le Caine, Pioneer (Ottawa, 
1989). See also Covington's article in this collection. 
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commercial or product-oriented, and a natural affinity between the two sets. The 
university was the foundation, as the proper repository of fundamental knowl-
edge and the sole source of supply of trained researchers. Industrial research 
was a matter for business, since no one else could understand markets so well as 
people who lived in them. There was, however, a role for government science, in 
bridging any gaps, i.e. providing those services and performing that research 
which was truly in the public rather than the private interest, and not provided by 
the university or industrial sectors. 
The logically first priority in 1946, just as in 1919, was to train more researchers 
because the Canadian supply did not yet meet Canadian needs. The NRC took 
up this second rather than first, since universities were in the postwar years un-
derfunded and crowded with returning veterans. University expansion began 
only in the late 1950s, after the federal government began making capitation 
grants (proposed by the Massey Report, 1951). The number of NRC scholar-
ships grew from 141 in 1946 to 423 in 1961, worth $1.2 million. From about 
1950 the Defence Research Board began making extramural grants and scholar-
ships on the NRC model, followed by the AECL and other Crown agencies. The 
NRC grants system was extended to buy capital equipment, funds were redi-
rected from NRC-controlled Associate Committees to disciplinary grants com-
mittees. The shock of Sputnik provoked the government to increase NRC 
funding for universities and induced engineering schools to accept it on the same 
basis as the natural sciences. By 1968 NRC grants approached $30 million a year 
and Canada was for the first time producing as many new PhDs in science and 
engineering as there were jobs for them. 
Within government, the success of the NRC's trial of pure research enclaves in 
industrially-oriented public laboratories led to its emulation by the departments 
of Mines and Agriculture in 1959. The NRC created new divisions for building 
research, radio and electrical engineering, chemical engineering, aeronautics 
and local industrial support in the Prairies and the Atlantic regions.24 Its role as 
co-ordinator of governmental science, a challenge to departmental tradition in 
Tory's day, was strengthened by Presidents Mackenzie (1944-52) and Steacie 
(1952-62.) They succeeded where Tory failed, in making the NRC the spokesman 
for science in government asprimus inter pares rather than a threatening empire. 
22 CJ. Mackenzie, 'Industrial Research in Postwar Canada/ Engineering Journal (March, 1944), 
136-149. 
23 W.P. Thompson, Graduate Education in the Sciences in Canadian Universities (Toronto, 
1963). 
24 Wilfrid Eggleston, National Research in Canada: the NRC 1916-1966 (Toronto, 1978. 
Historiography of NRC 183 
The administrative vehicle for government-wide co-ordination was a new body, 
the Advisory Panel on Scientific Policy, on which the statutory powers of the 
Privy Council Committee were devolved in 1949. NRC presidents chaired the 
Advisory Panel ex officio; the members were the research chiefs of all Crown 
agencies significantly active in science, such as the Chairman of the DRB and the 
deputy minister of Health. 
No history of the Advisory Panel has yet been written. This is regrettable because 
brief references to it in the Glassco Report on Government Organization (1963) 
are defective in important respects. An example is the NRC's Industrial Re-
search Assistance Programme, the basic precedent in Canada for making public 
grants to private industry. This may be thought of as either the culmination of the 
NRC's postwar industrial programme, or an act of desperation because every 
other incentive had been tried, without success, or a revolution in political ideol-
ogy since 1946, when such grants to private industry were unthinkable. ^IRAP 
was the main business of the Advisory Panel and of its NRC staff in 1961, and 
kept secret until approved by the Cabinet and announced the following year. 
The core of the Glassco Report had then been written and two fundamental con-
clusions reached. The policy machinery had broken down since the Privy Coun-
cil Committee ceased to meet in 1949; and the NRC had 'turned aside from its 
original duty of advising on broad national policy' and concentrated its attention 
on its own laboratories and university science. The Glassco field staff were un-
aware of the transfer of the Committee's powers to the Advisory Panel, which 
they did not investigate: and so did not discover the existence of IRAP until it 
was announced. Before publication their text was revised to add a reference to 
IRAP, the opinion of an industrialist that it would do no good. The Glassco Re-
port never mentioned IRAP by name and, having prepared recommendations 
for co-ordination of national science policy by a Cabinet minister with an inde-
pendent advisory council, did not temper its conclusions about what had actually 
happened in the past decade. 
The new government of 1963, elected on a reform ticket, received the Glassco 
Report with considerable enthusiasm, and many of its recommendations were 
implemented in the next decade. Revisions to the NRC Act in 1966 terminated 
its responsibility to advise the Cabinet, which it had exercised one way and an-
other since 1917, and the Council was in that respect superseded by the Science 
Secretariat formed in the Privy Council Office in 1964. The Science Secretariat 
became the Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MoSST) in 1971; this 
25 D J.C. Phillipson, The Steacie Myth and the Institutions of Industrial Research/ HSTC Bulle-
tin 25 (1983), 117-34. 
184 D J.C. Phillipson 
policy ministry was absorbed into the department of Industry, Science and Tech-
nology in 1990. 
The Glassco Report became important as a historical source for two dissimilar 
reasons. The minor reason was its publication of the first technically acceptable 
statistics on R and D, covering 1951-61. These began thirty years of increasingly 
reliable work on science by Statistics Canada. Secondly, the Glassco Report's 
hundred-page description of governmental science was taken as a reliable sum-
mary of its true character by the authors of the OECD report on Canadian sci-
ence policy (1969), the Special Committee on Science Policy of the Senate, 
which published the Lamontagne Report in four volumes 1970-74 and other au-
thors in the new discipline of science policy. 
These two inquiries could and did refer to publications unavailable to the 
Glassco Commission, particularly those of Thistle, Babbitt, Eggleston and 
Brown. The Lamontagne Committee's reliance on the Glassco Report and 
other secondary sources was demonstrated by instructions to witnesses to deal 
only with events since 1963. 
Subtitled A Critical Review: Past and Present,' the first volume of the 
Lamontagne Report (1970) included a historical narrative of more than 100 
pages. Its conclusions were that the NRC had a science policy before 1939 which 
(for no fault of its own) it was unable to implement; in 1945-63 (citing Glassco) 
the public duties, especially to industry, and policy mechanisms in the NRC Act 
were both ignored; and the NRC was principally responsible for the unsatisfac-
tory state of Canadian science in 1970. These conclusions led to a passionate and 
bitter debate that lasted several years. Like the Lamontagne Report itself this de-
bate mixed past history and future policy alternatives, and the merits of either 
are beyond the scope of a historiographie essay. 
Science Policy and the NRC Today 
Independently of their specific criticisms of individuals and institutions in Cana-
dian history, the Glassco and Lamontagne Reports were only one aspect of a 
general cultural change in the 1960s, which may be characterized as a world-
wide professionalization or disciplinarization of functions carried out in earlier 
26 J.D. Babbitt, Science in Canada: Selections from the Speeches of E.W.R. Steacie (To-
ronto,1965). 
27 J J. Brown, Ideas in Exile (Toronto, 1967 
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generations by precedent (tradition), personal leadership (innovation), consen-
sus and common sense (shared social values, sometimes unwritten). The sim-
plest visible sign of the new era was its attitude to paper. The old system did not 
require that information be written down or values exhaustively explicit, in order 
to reach firm decisions. In other words, the opinion of the top man (minister, 
NRC president, research director, deputy minister, etc.) was usually accepted as 
effective decision-making. The Glassco Report condemned this tradition in sev-
eral spheres besides science (e.g. foreign affairs and broadcasting). The new ap-
proach for which it was the spearhead claimed to make the process objective by 
removing the harmful effects of personality and prejudice. Specifically, it re-
quired or preferred information on paper, and at times seemed to exclude a pri-
ori personal experience, 'informed opinion' or any form of non-disciplinarized 
claims to knowledge. 
Post-Glassco reforms of the federal system of government introduced over the 
next fifteen years several formal techniques of modern management. For applied 
economics, to a considerable extent the parent discipline, an Economic Council 
was founded that sought to model the whole Canadian economy in mathematical 
terms, as well as provide non-partisan expert advice to politicians and citizens. 
For science, a new international discipline of Science Policy emerged, that prom-
ised both to optimize and de-politicize the national planning and maintenance of 
science. Now generally considered to have disappointed many of their early 
aims, each was part of an irresistible Zeitgeist. 
Perhaps prompted by Centennial celebrations, Canadian history was stimulated 
at the same time. There was an enormous increase in the 1970s in the production 
of history, in both French and English. For the first time, complete histories ap-
peared of such institutions as the Geological Survey, the Surveys and Mapping 
Branch, the Fisheries Research Board and so forth. The NRC began in 1975 a 
historical program of its own, creating an archives office and producing Eggle-
ston (1978) and the Gridgeman, Middleton and Phillipson titles mentioned 
above. Post-graduate institutes for the study of science were founded at the uni-
versities of Toronto and Montreal, and the Canadian Science and Technology 
Historical Association came into existence in 1978. 
The relevance of pure science was the focus of debate about the Lamontagne Re-
port. The social sciences suggested that, in any long-lived institution, there was a 
28 Richard French, How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy-Making 1968-1980 
(Toronto, 1980). 
29 R J \ . Jarrell and N.R. Ball, Science, Technology and Canadian History (Waterloo, 1980). 
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natural 'goal displacement' from the duty of social usefulness towards 
'fundamentalization' or concentration on pure research. Doern represented 
the younger, academic, critical school, and Hayes defended the traditions and 
innovations of the previous generation as both honest and successful. 
Oral debate was polarized between Sen Maurice Lamontagne, arguing that the 
NRC had displaced its goal towards pure science, which was generally wrong, 
and Gerhard Herzberg, the NRC's only Nobelist, citing Canada's now mature 
scientific reputation as proof that the NRC's goal of pure science was generally 
right. When pressed, both protagonists agreed that the records of the NRC Lab-
oratories showed it had never spent more than 20 per cent of its manpower and 
money on pure science, as Steacie had told a parliamentary committee in 1960. 
But arguments about pure science and 'relevance' dominated science policy 
after Lamontagne.32 The best publications on the topic are The Science 
Council's Report No. 18 (1972) and Background Study No. 21 (1971). Their 
ideas were however too subtle to be taken up by the Canadian political clientele, 
a contingency for which the discipline of Science Policy had made no provision. 
For public institutions, current science policy governed renewed interest in the 
1970s in the history of science. As their dates of publication suggest, three quar-
ters of the items cited here appeared in the last twenty years. Further items of 
NRC interest included memoirs and biographies, anniversary publications34 
and institutional histories. 
30 G. Bruce Doern, The NRC: the Causes of Goal Displacement/ Canadian Public Administra-
tion 13:2 (1970); Yakov Rabkin, Transnational Variables in Science Policies: Canadian and So-
viet Experiences,' Canadian Public Administration 24:1 (1981). 
31 G. Bruce Doern, Science and Politics in Canada (Montreal and Kingston, 1972) and F. Ron-
ald Hayes, The Chaining of Prometheus: Evolution of a Power Structure for Canadian Sci-
ence (Toronto, 1973). 
32 D J.C. Phillipson, 'Medical Research Policy for Canada/ Journal of the Canadian Medical As-
sociation 110 (1973), 1388 and 111 (1973), 58. 
33 W. H. Cook, My Fifty Years with NRC, 1924-1974 (Ottawa, 1977), J.H. Parkin, Aeronautical 
Research in Canada 1917-1957: Memoirs (Ottawa, 1983), 2 volumes, and E. Christine King, 
E.W.R Steacie and Science in Canada (Toronto, 1989). 
34 N. T. Gridgeman, 'A Semicentennial: the NRCC Research Journals 1929-1979,' Canadian 
Journal of Physics (1979). 
35 RH. Haskins, A Brief History of the NRCC Prairie Regional Laboratory (Saskatoon, 1984) 
and NRCC Division of Building Research, The First 25 Years, 1947 to 1972 (Ottawa, 1973. 
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Historians have however written almost nothing about changes at the NRC since 
1970, or elsewhere in government science such as the absorption into a depart-
ment of the previously independent Defence Research Board. This lends spe-
cial poignance to the official status of the Lamontagne Report, still used in 1992 
by government officials as the essential source on the NRC and the general his-
torical background on Canadian science. 
In no other sphere of public policy (e.g. medical, defence, economic) is a twenty-
year-old document considered current, let alone essential. The discipline of sci-
ence policy has shifted its ground in twenty years, from the wing of applied 
economics (suggesting precise calculation to approach an agreed goal) to that of 
political science (implying negotiation between people and interests with oppos-
ing goals). The process is documented in the work of Bruce Doern, prominent 
since his 1972 Science and Politics in Canada which enthusiastically applied to 
Canada the new theories of disciplinarized science policy. An exemplar was the 
Science Council's Report #4 (1968), predicated on a clear division of responsi-
bility between politicians, whose proper sphere was the promulgation of social 
and economic goals, and science policy technicians, who could calculate the op-
timal means to fulfil those goals. 
Empirical evidence accumulated in the next decade shows that these theories 
did not work in the Canadian context, contrary to expectations. Another ten 
years later he concluded that the administrative union of science policy, trade 
policy and industrial policy was unlikely to succeed in integrating them logically 
or politically. 
Since 1966 the NRC has changed in fundamental respects. It is no longer the 
largest or the highest-reputed scientific organization in the country. The largest 
is Bell-Northern Research Ltd and, while the NRC's citation impact factor is 
high, many universities now have larger and more specialized research teams. 
NRC's financial responsibility for university science, i.e. the infrastructure of na-
tional science, ended in 1978. Its governing Council has changed from the élite of 
university science to a representative sample of industrial research chiefs, inevi-
36 The case of the Fisheries Research Board is treated in Frances Anderson, 'Policy Determina-
tion of Government Scientific Organizations: A Case Study of the Fisheries Research Board, 
1963 to 1973/ (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Université de Montreal, 1988). 
37 G. Bruce Doern, Government Intervention in the Nuclear Industry (Montreal, 1980) and The 
Peripheral Nature of Scientific and Technological Controversy in Federal Policy Formation -
Science Council Background Study 46 (Ottawa, 1981). 
38 G. Bruce Doern, 'The Department of Industry, Science and Technology: Is there Industrial 
Policy after Free Trade?' in K. Graham, éd., How Ottawa Spends, 1990-91 (Ottawa, 1990). 
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tably lacking the prior personal acquaintance and common experiences that pro-
vided the basis of policy consensus when the whole scientific community was 
much smaller. 
The real dispute about public science and the role of the NRC was less about the 
'relevance' and economic and social utility than about criteria by which that util-
ity was to be assessed. Different criteria have been used in four distinct periods 
of Canadian history. 
Economic and social utility were specified in the NRC Act of 1917, as in most 
statutes providing for government-funded activities, and proclaimed in bronze at 
the front door of the NRC's Sussex Drive headquarters: 
This building was constructed for the purposes of fostering the scientific development of Canadian 
industry for Canadian needs and for the extension and expansion of Canadian trade at home and 
abroad. 
In the period up to the Second World War, this utility was assessed by personal 
consensus between spokesmen for public science, the chief executives of the 
NRC and other agencies, and their political masters. There were no strict rules 
of evidence. Both parties could make their own demands, typically politicians re-
quiring that science conform to the Canadian tradition of regional balance and 
scientists seeking professional autonomy in such matters as research publica-
tions. They were arbitrated by personal discussion. The ultimate sanction, dis-
missal or resignation on a point of principle, was never reached in the history of 
the NRC's relations with its politicians. 
A notable NRC contribution to science policy in the postwar era, attributed 
principally to E.W.R. Steacie, was an enlargement of the definition of appropri-
ate public science beyond applied or industrial research. Its objective was the 
health of the scientific institution, on a national or smaller basis. In order to re-
main healthy (intellectually productive), the NRC Laboratories, a government 
foundation with industrial responsibilities, needed the psychological and intel-
lectual stimulation best provided by a changmg population of young temporary 
researchers (post-doctoral fellows), working alongside the tenured and aging 
NRC staff40 The norms by which Steacie justified this innovation were the famil-
iar and accepted ones; personal reputation and do-it-yourself history, such as the 
truth that many of the material innovations of the Second World War, such as 
39 C J. Mackenzie, op. cit (1944). 
40 E. Christine King, E.W.R. Steacie and Science in Canada (Toronto, 1989). 
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radar, penicillin and the atomic bomb, came out of universities rather than gov-
ernment laboratories. 
The beneficiaries of Steacie's pure research theory were the NRC staff of these 
divisions and the floating population of PDFs. Both were envied, the NRC staff 
by colleagues in other divisions and the PDFs at the universities or industries 
they later joined, where two whole years of full-time research was then simply 
impossible. The world-wide fame of the Steacie system, and clarity with which its 
results documented themselves (in research publications, which NRC work on 
standards, assignments for government departments and industrial contracts 
rarely produced) meant that it featured prominently in NRC pride and propa-
ganda. Statistics of research staff and spending suggest that one of Steacie's sec-
ondary goals, of the NRC modelling the lifelong research career, which 
Canadian universities and industries would be tempted to emulate, was totally 
successful. It was ironic that this success would later provide a convenient stick 
for the NRC's back, when the visible achievements of 15 per cent of the NRC 
were construed to suggest the whole of the NRC was a 'republic of science,' 
where private interests were pursued at public expense, disdainful of the indus-
trial work for which Parliament appropriated the money. 
When Science Policy claimed the status of a specialized discipline, it offered new 
and different criteria for decisions. Its ultimate promise was to replace personal 
impressions about scientific matters with a truly scientific calculus, usually con-
ceived as a giant input-output matrix which could reliably forecast the conse-
quences of alternative choices. This promised to relieve politicians of the burden 
of acting beyond their sphere of personal experience, and to relieve scientists of 
the need to lobby uncomprehending politicians to get the money the national in-
terest genuinely required. The prospect of a comprehensive decision-making 
calculus extended far beyond laboratory research to all spheres of government. 
Many influential bureaucrats genuinely believed in the 1970s that new tech-
niques would allow them to compare the net benefit to Canadians of $1 million 
added to one 'envelope,' e.g. pharmaceutical grants or public health education, 
or taken away from another, e.g. hospital funding or medical research. Enthusi-
asts of 'systems management' tended to suggest merely proving the advantages of 
something new would actually cause people to implement it. As early as 1973 the 
Chairman of the Science Council warned that it was no good the government's 
promulgating an excellent policy without incentives for humans to carry it out. 
41 Roger Gaudry, 'Annual Report of the Chairman/ in Science Council of Canada, Annual Re-
port 1972-73 (Ottawa, 1973. 
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For reasons beyond the scope of this essay, the new methods of science policy 
and public administration did not satisfy either politicians or scientists to the de-
gree their designers had confidently expected. Science policy today appears to 
have entered a fourth phase, different from both social practice 1917-64 and 
structural theory 1964-80. Its character is imprecise, except that in hard eco-
nomic times government science has been 'repoliticized' more than was thought 
likely twenty years ago. 
This is not an isolated phenomenon or all bad. The present government has paid 
more attention than any of its predecessors to the role of provincial governments 
in science policy, which is constitutional common sense. But other decisions 
and emphases have alienated both members of the scientific community and sci-
ence policy professionals (a remnant, because most of the policy staff of the 
1970s have moved into other types of work). Well-documented warnings of the 
deterioration of the national infrastructure of science have been generally ig-
nored by political authority. In 1992 the government abolished both the Eco-
nomic Council and the Science Council, hitherto the official sources of 
non-partisan expert advice. 
The competence and quality of scientific advice to government was the reason 
Canada adopted the new discipline of science policy after the Glassco Report. 
Hitherto an NRC responsibility, as Clause 5 of the 1917 Act was interpreted, it 
became a function of deputy ministers of MoSST. When that ministry was ab-
sorbed the post of Chief Science Adviser was written into the organic Act of the 
department of Industry, Science and Technology (1990) - and left vacant. The 
government had formed in 1986 a new National Advisory Board on Science and 
Technology, chaired by the prime minister (with terms of reference almost iden-
tical with those of the NRC in 1916). This body was reorganized in 1991 when it 
met once. 
Internally, the NRC has been totally reorganized by President Pierre Perron 
since 1990. The number of vice-presidents (seven or eight under his predeces-
sor) were reduced to three in a new management system. NRC laboratory Divi-
sions were reorganized as Institutes; the post of Divisional Director, an NRC 
innovation in 1928, was replaced by a Director-General, the same nomenclature 
as in government departments. When Dr Perron first took office he turned for 
long-term policy ideas not to the Council, under the NRC's tradition, but to the 
Science Council, which held a special two-day conference for the purpose. 
42 Paul Dufour and Yves Gingras, 'Development of Canadian Science and Technology Policy,' 
Science and Public Policy 15 (Feb. 1988), 13-18. 
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These changes together tell historians there has been a transformation of institu-
tional memory, but that memory is still acknowledged as a prerequisite of effec-
tive policy. In Canada up to the 1960s, the personal experience of NRC 
presidents and Council members, university deans, deputy ministers and so on, 
appeared to be an effective and legitimate basis of institutional memory. As the 
Glassco Report agreed, many aspects of Canadian science thrived vigorously in 
the 1950s. But the reformers also pointed out the traditional system did not sup-
port the mechanisms of guaranteed efficiency and impartiality promised by new 
management techniques, and political authority found this convincing. 
An independent force for change was the sheer growth of the body of scientific 
knowledge and the numbers of the Canadian research community. Personal 
knowledge might be adequate for managing and enlarging a fraternity of a few 
hundreds in 1945, but could not be expected to cope with a Canadian research 
community of 18,000 in 1975 or at least 50,000 in 1991. As scholars from Max 
Weber to Derek Price had observed, the Gemeinschaft was bound to evolve into 
a Gesellschaft and to change its social relations. 
The institutional memory formerly pooled from the minds of a few score individ-
uals is now represented by more than a metre of Science Council reports and 
studies 1966-90 and the increasingly refined publications of Statistics Canada's 
science and technology section (some recently discontinued for economy). Im-
measurably more, and more concrete, information now exists than was available 
to the science policy structures of twenty years ago: but those mechanisms have 
been largely dismantled. 
The parent stock of so many Canadian institutions, from the Canadian Standards 
Association to today's university grants councils, the NRC has declined relatively 
as its scions grew to maturity. When it was free to act independently, the NRC 
made no attempt to preserve the monopolies of power that characterized it in 
the 1940s. By a deliberate act of policy, it sought to plant out science broadly 
throughout Canada, beyond its own institutional borders. 
Choosing itself not to grow, the NRC could not have hoped to maintain its 
power, because the intellectual and industrial systems of the world have grown at 
least tenfold since 1945. 'Monopoly is no exaggeration to describe the NRC at 
that date. In some fields of industrial technology, such as electronics, acoustics, 
the chemistry of explosives and foods, the NRC staff of 1945 knew more than any 
industrial team in Canada. In certain academic disciplines, from biometrics and 
nuclear physics, the NRC enjoyed a similar monopoly of up-to-date knowledge; 
43 G. Bruce Doern, Government Intervention in the Nuclear Industry (Montreal, 1980). 
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in all disciplines, what Council members and NRC staff did not carry in then-
heads could be easily obtained through their web of personal contacts with all 
Canadian and many foreign scholars. 
Between 1960 and 1980 this ceased. The Canadian centre of intellectual gravity 
in industrial technology is now in industry, and of academic science in the uni-
versities - precisely what the NRC had set out to create. Science within govern-
ment had achieved similar maturity and ceased to depend on the NRC's 
resources. Government departments require expertise on aviation safety, radio-
activity in the atmosphere, the effectiveness of tax incentives for corporate re-
search and a thousand other technical topics. Thirty years ago the NRC was the 
only Canadian source of this expertise: today all departments have appropriately 
specialized scientists and engineers of their own. This too indicates successful 
completion of the NRC's 1945 policy of polycentric growth. 
The body of scientific knowledge has so changed that it is no longer possible for 
twenty Council members or a few hundred researchers to command it to the de-
gree the NRC could claim in the 1940s. Not least, the membership of the Council 
stands in a different relation to its client community. Canadian industry, than 
formerly when its members represented academic science. Because membership 
was an honour, the NRC in earlier years could draw on the whole Canadian uni-
versity community for Council members. Council membership is not similarly 
considered an honour among Canadian industrialists, and some corporations 
simply will not allow their research directors to sit on such bodies as the Council 
of the NRC. However broadly the Council of 1992 represents Canadian industry, 
it does not provide the NRC with the intellectual resources it used to derive from 
a university-based Council. 
Even the environment of bureaucratic power has changed fundamentally in Ot-
tawa since the Glassco Report. The most obvious case is the source of senior 
managers, deputy ministers and likely future deputy-ministers. For scientific de-
partments such as Mines and Health, these were selected in the bad old days ex-
clusively from men of individual departmental or professional reputation, aged 
fifty or more, with experience in administration and a demonstrated natural gift 
for it. The adoption throughout government of new management techniques, 
administered by the Treasury Board, effectively created a new ruling class, of 
44 The privileged autonomy of managerial scientists with professional qualifications was demon-
strated by their names: Dominion Archivist, Dominion Astronomer, Dominion Cerealist, Do-
minion Chemist, Dominion Geologist, Dominion Hydrographer, Dominion Limnologist, 
Dominion Statistician, and so on. All these titles have now been abolished: less because the 
word 'dominion' is out of fashion, it appears, than because the supervision of scientists and 
professionals no longer requires scientific or professional standing, as for the previous century. 
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trained men and women, whose expertise is in those techniques. A crucial differ-
ence is that the ambitious individual has to join this career stream before the age 
of forty. Few scientists of ability are willing to give up research so early. The 
present system may make it practically impossible for the best government scien-
tists to end their careers in senior management positions. 
A political foundation, the NRC has not in recent years been of much interest to 
politicians. This was not always so. Discussion in the House of Commons of the 
NRC Act of 1946 was passionate and wide-ranging. Continuing lively interest 
was manifest in Commons Committee investigations in 1950,1956 and 1960, and 
reached its climax in the Lamontagne Senate Committee hearings of 1967-70. In 
the last 22 years, however, neither chamber of Parliament has investigated any 
aspect of the NRC except jobs abolished in economy drives. 
Politicians' indifference to the NRC reflects the logic of amendments to the 
NRC's mandated sphere of work. Since 1945 the NRC has 'lost' responsibility for 
military research, nuclear energy, medical research, advice to the Cabinet, uni-
versity support and most recently space research (1989). On the other hand, Par-
liament has never managed to say specifically what it wishes the NRC to do. 
Older scientists often interpret the devolution of specific NRC functions as pun-
ishment for the indictment brought by the Glassco and Lamontagne Reports; 
most younger men and women are apathetic about bureaucratic arrangements 
that do not affect them personally or professionally. 
This leaves open the questions of what the NRC is expected to do in 1993, now 
just one institution among many, and how to maintain in hard times the intellec-
tual youth and vigour it so valued a generation ago. The determining environ-
ment of both is the character of 'Ottawa,' and the rules of being a government 
institution. Fortunately none of these is a question the historian is obliged to an-
swer. 
